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INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS or Statute) provides victims of
human rights abuses with a powerful tool-it permits foreign plaintiffs
to bring claims of violations of the law of nations against foreign de-
fendants in the U.S. district courts.' Although Congress originally
passed the ATS in 1789, the first successful modern use of the Statute
did not occur until 1961.2 Application of the ATS remains in its in-
t BA, Wesleyan University, 2004; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2011; Executive Editor,
Cornell Law Review, Volume 96. I would like to thank the members of the Cornell Law Review
for their hard work and insight throughout the editing process, especially Eduardo Bruera,
Rebecca Klotzle, Laura Sedlak, Catherine Milne, Pooja Faldu, and Sue Pado. I would also
like to thank my family for their unwavering support.
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
2 See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865, 867 (D. Md. 1961) (sustaining jurisdiction
under the ATS but dismissing the claim on other grounds); PETER HENNER, HUMAN RIGHTS
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fancy, with the district courts determining what constitutes a viable
claim.3
The Statute's expansive jurisdiction allows the district courts to
reach decisions that impact the foreign policy of the United States. In
fact, in 2004, the Supreme Court recommended that the district
courts restrict the class of claims that a plaintiff could bring under the
ATS; 4 concerns about decisions' effects on foreign policy motivated
the Court's reasoning.5 The Court's ultimate guidance, however, is
vague and can be difficult to apply to actually produce the results that
the Court stated it wanted-a limitation on the claims brought under
the Statute.6 In the absence of further instruction, the scope of the
ATS may continue to grow, and consequently courts may involve
themselves in foreign policy or in the internal politics of other
nations.
This possibility raises the question of how to limit the ATS prop-
erly so that victims of violations of human rights have access to redress
while ensuring that the district courts do not overstep their bounds by
issuing decisions that affect foreign policy. In other words, what is the
best method to guarantee that the district courts abide by the Su-
preme Court's ruling and remain a civil forum for certain violations of
human rights?
In this Note, I will address this question. Ultimately, I recom-
mend that the circuit courts implement a limitation that the Ninth
Circuit adopted in 2008: prudential exhaustion.7 This approach re-
quires that plaintiffs in ATS cases in which there is a weak nexus to the
United States exhaust all claims of violations of norms that are not
peremptory.8 Adopting this rule could greatly reduce the number of
claims available to plaintiffs under the ATS. Thus, prudential exhaus-
AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LAW, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 43 (2009) ("[J]urisdiction was
sustained in only two cases [prior to Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980]: Bolchos v. Darrell in 1795
and Adra v. Clift in 1961." (footnotes omitted)).
3 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that the ATS
"has rarely been the basis for jurisdiction during its long history").
4 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) ("[W]e think courts should
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of interna-
tional character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable
to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.").
5 See id. at 727 ("It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits
on our own State and Federal Governments' power, but quite another to consider suits
under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign govern-
ments . . . and to hold that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those
limits.").
6 See id. at 731-32.
7 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (plurality
opinion).
8 See infra Part II.B and note 117.
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tion is consistent with principles of comity.9 It would lead to further
legitimacy of decisions under the ATS and yet afford victims of viola-
tions of human rights a forum for their claims.
Part I of this Note provides background on the ATS, including an
analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
Part II introduces prudential exhaustion by providing the history of
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, the case in which the Ninth Circuit held that claims
under the ATS require prudential exhaustion. Part III analyzes pru-
dential exhaustion by explaining the benefits of such an approach as
compared to two other approaches. In addition, this Part provides a
definition of peremptory norms and argues that the prudential ex-
haustion framework should operate to require exhaustion for claims
of violations of nonperemptory norms where the claim has a weak
nexus to the United States. Part IV discusses the potential limitations
of prudential exhaustion.
I
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
A. Brief History of the Alien Tort Statute
In its entirety, the Alien Tort Statute reads: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."10 Congress passed the Statute as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, but for almost two hundred years, plaintiffs rarely
brought claims under the Statute."
In 1980, the Second Circuit breathed new life into the Statute
when it allowed a plaintiff to bring an ATS claim in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.12
In Filartiga, Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter brought a suit against
Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, the Inspector General of Police in
Asunci6n, Paraguay, for wrongfully causing the death of Filartiga's
son, Joelito.' 3 Filartiga was an outspoken opponent of the govern-
ment of Paraguay, and he contended that Pena-Irala kidnapped, tor-
tured, and killed Joelito in retaliation for Filartiga's political
opposition.14 The Second Circuit held that torture violated the law of
nations as understood under the ATS15 and remanded the case to the
9 See Sarei, 550 F.3d at 828-29.
10 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
11 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (referring to the ATS as
a "rarely-invoked provision"); HENNER, supra note 2, at 58 (noting that Filartiga "open [ed]
the door to modern ATS litigation").
12 630 F.2d at 889.
13 See id. at 878.
14 Id.
15 See id. at 884.
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district court for further proceedings consistent with its holding that
federal jurisdiction existed for claims of torture under the ATS.16
In another well-known case, Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,17 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that citizens of Myanmar could bring claims of forced labor,
rape, and murder under the ATS against Unocal Corporation.18 Al-
though the Myanmar military committed the acts, the court found
that the corporate defendant could be held liable under the ATS for
aiding and abetting.19 The Ninth Circuit granted this ruling an en
banc review, thus negating the ruling's precedential effect.20 An en
banc panel of the Ninth Circuit, however, never heard the case be-
cause the parties agreed to settle and dismissed all claims. 21
Whether aiding-and-abetting liability exists under the ATS re-
mains an open question. The possibility of seeking redress against
corporations under such liability means that plaintiffs can bring a suit
against a corporation for actions taken in connection with that corpo-
ration's business in a foreign country. If the plaintiffs win, they can
seek to enforce their judgment against that company's assets within
the United States.22 Since 2004, roughly half of the cases involving
the ATS have included claims against corporations. 23
In the fall of 2010, the Second Circuit held in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. that corporations could not be held liable under the ATS
because customary international law does not recognize corporate lia-
bility.2 4 This ruling will obviously have a significant impact on ATS
litigation. There are, however, several facts to bear in mind. The ma-
jority in Kiobel made clear that the ruling does not affect a plaintiffs
ability to bring a suit against an individual, which includes a corporate
employee, manager, officer, or director.25 Additionally, because the
majority based its opinion on the norms of customary international
law, which are subject to adaptation, it is possible that in a future case
the Second Circuit will determine that corporate liability has become
a norm under customary international law. Additionally, no other cir-
16 Id. at 889.
17 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir.
2003).
18 Id. at 956, 962-63.
19 See id. at 947.
20 See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The three-judge
panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the
Ninth Circuit, except to the extent adopted by the en banc court.").
21 Unocal reportedly settled for approximately thirty million dollars. HENNER, supra
note 2, at 76.
22 Several well-known corporations have faced litigation under the ATS, including
Texaco, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, and Coca-Cola. See HENNER, supra note 2, at 73 & n.188.
23 See MICHAEL KOEBELE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILIlY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
6 (2009).
24 See 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010).
25 Id. at 149.
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cuits have ruled that customary international law does not recognize
corporate liability. Lastly, an en banc panel of the Second Circuit may
hear Kiobel, leaving open the possibility of the court reaching a differ-
ent outcome. 26
Courts have generally limited what claims a plaintiff can bring
under the ATS. As of 2006, there have been approximately only 150
cases involving the ATS, and courts have dismissed most of these
cases. 27 The actions that courts have allowed under the Statute in-
clude, amongst others, "genocide, torture, summary execution, disap-
pearance, war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery, arbitrary
detention, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment."28
The relatively small quantity of claims, however, is not a reason to
believe that an analysis of the future of the ATS is unimportant. Since
plaintiffs first used the Statute successfully only fifty years ago, courts
are slowly determining its boundaries. In the process, every case in-
volves questions of foreign relations because each includes accusa-
tions against foreign corporations, against individuals acting in
another country, or against foreign states themselves. 29 In addition,
the frequency with which plaintiffs bring claims is increasing as plain-
tiffs learn how to use the Statute as an effective tool to prosecute
human rights violations.30 Nongovernmental organizations are a driv-
ing force behind ATS litigation,3' and they have pressured courts to
expand what claims the ATS can recognize.32 Courts have thus far
limited the types of claims that constitute violations of the law of na-
tions, but there is no guarantee that such self-regulation will continue
with equal vehemence as courts hear more and more claims. The ATS
places power in the hands of lower-court judges to determine what
constitutes a violation of the law of nations, a concept that is evolving
26 Although Kiobel could dramatically reduce the number of cases brought under the
ATS, its holding does not alter the question being addressed in this Note: how to define
and limit the scope of claims brought under the ATS.
27 BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS
12 (2d ed. 2008).
28 Id. at 63; see also HENNER, supra note 2, at 133-77 (providing examples of when
courts have recognized murder or extrajudicial killing, racial discrimination, nonconsen-
sual medical experimentation, and arbitrary denationalization).
29 Cf HENNER, supra note 2, at 245 ("ATS cases have involved governmental policies in
more than 30 countries since . . . Filarliga.").
30 Cf JEFFREY DAVIS,JUSTICE ACROSS BORDERS 55-56, 61-64 (2008) ("Since the Fildrtiga
decision, human rights NGOs have worked to pursue innovative claims through the
ATS.... NGO advocates ... expanded the targets of ATS litigation by seeking to hold
private actors, corporations, and commanders responsible for human rights violations.").
31 See id. at 50-88 (chronicling the role of nongovernmental organizations in ATS
litigation and arguing that a plaintiff is more likely to win if represented by such an
organization).
32 See id. at 51.
2011] 1277
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
over time.33 For example, in 2009, in a case brought under the ATS,
the Second Circuit determined that medical experimentation without
consent could constitute a violation of the law of nations.3 4 This de-
termination was the first of its kind.35 In years to come, district courts
will continue to play the role of arbiters of what constitutes a violation
of the law of nations. What ATS jurisprudence lacks, though, is gui-
dance for the district court judges who make such determinations.
B. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
Perhaps in response to the growing use of the ATS, in 2004 the
Supreme Court decided to hear its first-and so far only-ATS case. 6
In Sosa, the Court sought to provide limits on the claims plaintiffs
could bring under the ATS.3 7 Before doing so, the Court placed the
Statute in context by discussing the origins of the ATS, the intentions
of the drafters, and the claims recognized under the Statute in 1789.38
The Court stated that when Congress passed the Statute, it had, at
most, three specific violations of the law of nations in mind: offenses
against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy.39
The Court then turned its focus to the modern use of the ATS.
The majority stressed that district courts should act cautiously in de-
termining what claims a plaintiff can bring under the ATS.4 0 It of-
fered five arguments to support this conclusion. First, the Court
stated that the prevailing interpretation of the common law has
changed since the enactment of the ATS.41 Second, Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins42 and its progeny have greatly limited the scope of federal
common law.43 Third, it is best to leave the creation of private rights
33 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714-21 (2004) (acknowledging the role
of the common law in determining actionable offenses under the ATS).
34 See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009).
35 Cf HENNER, supra note 2, at 175-76 ("The [Abdullahil court's opinion is a useful
model of how a new tort claim may be recognized as a violation of international law and
thus be actionable under the ATS."); KOEBELE, supra note 23, at 115 (noting the pre-Abdul-
lahi "uncertaint[y] as to the actionability of the right to informed consent to medical ex-
perimentation" under the ATS).
36 See Sosa, 542 U.S. 692; KOEBELE, supra note 23, at 6.
37 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 ("[T] here are good reasons for a restrained conception of
the discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action [under
the ATS].").
38 Id. at 712-24.
39 Id. at 720.
40 See id. at 725.
41 Id. ("[Today], . . . in most cases where a court is asked to state or formulate a
common law principle in a new context, there is a general understanding that the law is
not so much found or discovered as it is either made or created.").
42 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 ("Erie ... was the watershed in which we denied the exis-
tence of any federal 'general' common law, which largely withdrew to havens of spe-
cialty . . . ." (citations omitted)).
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of action to the legislature. 44 Fourth, ATS litigation can possibly affect
U.S. foreign relations. The Court stressed that lower courts should be
"particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative
and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs."45 Fifth, the
courts lack a congressional mandate to define violations of the law of
nations.46
Despite its explicit reasoning, the Court did not provide clear gui-
dance on what specific claims a plaintiff can bring under the ATS. On
the one hand, it determined that 'judicial power should be exercised
on the understanding that the door [of the ATS] is still ajar subject to
vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international
norms today."4 7 The term "narrow class" provides the impression that
the Court did not want the ATS to be a basis for claims of violations of
any and all customary international laws. District courts are to act as
doorkeepers, ensuring that certain claims cannot be brought under
the ATS.
On the other hand, instead of defining exactly what claims a
plaintiff can bring, the Court provided a vague standard for district
courts to use in fulfilling their doorkeeping function: "[C]ourts
should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to
rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms we have recognized."4 8 The Supreme Court
did not clarify how to compare the present-day law of nations to the
eighteenth-century paradigms-i.e., offenses against ambassadors, vio-
lations of safe conduct, and piracy.49 In other words, while stating
that the ATS is not a basis for claims of violations of all customary
international laws, the Court did not specify which particular claims
comprise the "narrow class."
C. The Alien Tort Statute After Sosa
The directive to district courts to exercise "vigilant doorkeeping,"
combined with a lack of specific guidance, generates room for debate
over what claims are and are not cognizable under the ATS.50 From
44 Id. at 727.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 728.
47 Id. at 729.
48 Id. at 725.
49 See id. at 720.
50 In addition to the Court's vague standard, the fact that the majority's opinion
evades easy summation contributes to the lack of clarity. See Stephen Satterfield, Note, Still
Crying Out for Clarification: The Scope of Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute After Sosa, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 216, 234 (2008) ("[T]he Supreme Court's guidance in Sosa about the nature
of the ATS is dispersed throughout the Court's opinion, and thus defies easy recitation.").
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the majority opinion, one can reach the conclusion that the Court
meant to limit the ATS to violations of peremptory norms-norms by
which all states are bound, regardless of the state's consent.5' Al-
though this conclusion is reasonable, the Supreme Court never used
the term "peremptory norm" in Sosa.52 There is, also, no evidence to
suggest that certain customary international law norms that do not
rise to the level of "peremptory" would fail to meet the requirement of
being "norm[s] of international character accepted by the civilized
world."53
The lack of a clear standard for district courts to follow in decid-
ing claims under the ATS has caused courts to reach varying conclu-
sions. As commentators have argued, "By delegating 'door keeping'
responsibility to a vast and diverse group of federal trial judges with-
out meaningful guidance or standards, the Sosa Court set the stage for
a mass of conflicting and confusing decisions that inevitably followed
in its wake." 54
Although the variations among district courts might be minimal
now-only seven years removed from Sosa-the more pressing issue is
that even if Sosa did not provide clear guidance, the Court certainly
meant to set limits on what claims could be cognizable under the
ATS.55 In Sosa, the Court did not criticize the decisions that the lower
courts had previously reached under the ATS.5 6 In fact, the Court
endorsed much of what several lower courts had determined about
the appropriate scope of the ATS.5 7 Yet, the Court repeatedly insisted
that the lower courts act as vigilant doorkeepers and stressed the im-
portance of doing so. 5 8 In Sosa's wake, it is unclear if Sosa has really
had its intended effect of limiting claims. 5 9
51 For a more detailed discussion of peremptory norms, see infta Part III.A.
52 Instead, the Sosa Court uses such terms as "norm [s] of international character" and
"customary international law." See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, 728.
53 Id. at 725.
54 Richard 0. Faulk, The Expanding Role of the Alien Torts Act in International Human
Rights Enforcement, 10 ANALYSIS & PERSP. 294, 296 (2009); see KOEBELE, supra note 23, at 37
("Due to the immense rhetorical assertions of the majority on the standard's narrowness,
the test proposed by the Supreme Court appears straightforward, narrow, and clear-cut.
Nevertheless, applying it may not be as simple as it looks.").
55 See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
56 See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 57.
57 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 ("The position we take today has been assumed by some
federal courts for 24 years . . . .").
58 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
59 SeeJohn B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The
Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, Speech at Vanderbilt University Law School
(Apr. 11, 2008), in 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2 (2009) ("ATS litigation continues largely
unabated, despite the Supreme Court's attempt in Sosa to rein it in.").
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A recent Second Circuit case, Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.,6o illustrates
some of the difficulties that lower courts have faced in applying Sosa.
In Abdullahi, the plaintiff sought to bring a claim under the ATS for
nonconsensual medical experimentation on humans. 61 The Second
Circuit wrote at length about the required universality and specificity
of a claim under the ATS post-Sosa and stated that ATS claims must
meet three criteria: "Courts are obligated to examine how the specific-
ity of the norm compares with 18th-century paradigms, whether the
norm is accepted in the world community, and whether States univer-
sally abide by the norm out of a sense of mutual concern." 62
Although this test presents the appearance that the Second Cir-
cuit is following Sosa's directive of vigilant doorkeeping, in practice it
does not seem to limit a plaintiff's claim to any more narrow a cate-
gory than the category of violations of customary international law.
For a prohibition on conduct to be considered customary interna-
tional law, the world community must accept the prohibition and
abide by it out of a sense of mutual concern-opinio juris. 63 Taken
together, these two requirements result in all customary international
law norms automatically satisfying two of the three criteria set forth by
the Second Circuit. Furthermore, when the Second Circuit compared
the plaintiffs claim to eighteenth-century paradigms, the first crite-
rion of the Abdullahi test, it looked at international treaties and do-
mestic law64-some of the same bases for determining customary
international law. As a result, some courts and commentators have
concluded that all violations of customary international law are cogni-
zable under the ATS. 65
60 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
61 Id. at 168.
62 Id. at 176; cf Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying a similar standard); In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d
228, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same).
63 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987) ("Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."); STEPHENS ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 66-72 (defining and discussing "customary international law" in the con-
text of the ATS).
64 See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 184--85:
The Nuremberg Code, Article 7 of the [International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights], the Declaration of Helsinki, the Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics
and Human Rights, the 2001 Clinical Trial Directive, and the domestic laws
of at least eighty-four States all uniformly and unmistakably prohibit medi-
cal experiments on human beings without their consent, thereby providing
concrete content for the norm.
65 See generally HENNER, supra note 2, at 115-21 (discussing the implication that all
violations of customary international law are cognizable under the ATS).
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The ATS states that a plaintiff can bring claims "committed in
violation of the law of nations."6 6 If all norms of customary interna-
tional law are cognizable under the ATS, however, then the Supreme
Court's doorkeeping mandate to limit the ATS to a "narrow class of
international norms"6 7 means nothing; Sosa would serve no purpose.
Most likely, the Second Circuit did not intentionally disregard the
doorkeeping mandate in Sosa. In fact, the Second Circuit explicitly
acknowledged the courts' obligation to limit the category of claims
acceptable under the ATS. 68 What the Second Circuit's reasoning
demonstrates, however, is that the Supreme Court's mandate in Sosa is
difficult to implement with precision.
The Court's lack of guidance in Sosa has left district courts with
just as much discretion as they had prior to Sosa. District courts lack
standards for comparing modern-day claims to eighteenth-century
paradigms. In Abdullahi, the Second Circuit relied on the very sources
used to determine customary international law. Without clearer direc-
tion, the ATS could become a jurisdictional basis for any and all viola-
tions of customary international law that the lower courts choose to
allow. If this is the case, the same concerns that the Supreme Court
hoped to limit-overreaching by the courts and involvement in issues
of foreign policy-will continue to exist despite the Court's best ef-
forts. This result raises the question of how best to limit the district
courts so as to ensure they fulfill Sosa's mandate of vigilant doorkeep-
ing and to guarantee that they do not unnecessarily involve them-
selves in foreign policy.
II
SAREI v. Rio TINTo AND PRUDENTIAL ExHAUSTION
There have been various suggestions for how to assure that courts
limit the types of claims that a plaintiff can bring under the ATS.
Some advocate that a plaintiff should exhaust all other claims before
he or she can file an ATS claim in the United States (a proposal re-
ferred to as "mandatory exhaustion") .69 This rule would require the
plaintiff to exhaust adequate and available remedies where the act oc-
curred; only if such remedies did not exist could a plaintiff bring a
66 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
67 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
68 See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d. at 173-74.
69 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (Bybee, J.,
dissenting), vacated en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (plurality opinion); Bellinger,
supra note 59, at 12-13; Rosica (Rose) Popova, Sarei v. Rio Tinto and the Exhaustion of Local
Remedies Rule in the Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act: Short-TermJustice, but at What Cost?, 28
H-AMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 517, 519 (2007).
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claim under the ATS.70 This approach is identical to the exhaustion
provision of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), which
provides a civil cause of action against those acting on behalf of a for-
eign nation who participated in torture or extrajudicial killings.71
The majority in Sosa briefly discussed exhaustion in its decision. 72
The European Commission, as amicus curiae, argued that interna-
tional law requires exhaustion before a plaintiff can bring a claim
under the ATS. 73 In a footnote, the Court stated that it "would cer-
tainly consider [the exhaustion] requirement in an appropriate
case." 74 The Court subsequently made no further mention of the
issue.
Another suggestion has been to limit the ATS to a list of specific
claims that federal legislation designates.75 The majority in Sosa states
that it would welcome congressional guidance on what claims a plain-
tiff should be able to bring under the ATS. 76 In 2005, Senator Diane
Feinstein proposed legislation to amend the ATS by limiting it to
claims of torture, extrajudicial killing, genocide, piracy, slavery, and
slave trading.77 The bill, however, never made it out of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.78
Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit recently adopted a third ap-
proach to dealing with the ATS: prudential exhaustion.79 Under this
approach, district courts determine which claims require exhaustion
before allowing those claims to proceed.80 In Parts III and IV, I dis-
cuss prudential exhaustion and argue that it is the best approach to
the ATS and that other circuits should adopt it. To fully demonstrate
the advantages of prudential exhaustion, I examine the Ninth Circuit
70 See Popova, supra note 69, at 528-29 ("[T] he [exhaustion] rule requires that before
asserting a claim in a foreign judicial forum, the claimant gives its domestic legal system a
fair chance to resolve the dispute by exhausting any remedies available in the claimant's
home state.").
71 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified in a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2006)).
72 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
73 Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Commission in Support of Neither Party at
24, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339).
74 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
75 This suggestion is also similar to the TVPA. See Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified in a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2006)) (limiting claims under the TVPA to claims of torture and extrajudicial killing).
76 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.
77 See S. 1874, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005).
78 Bill Summary & Status, 109th Congress (2005-2006): S. 1874, LIBR. CONGRsSs, http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d09:s.01874: (reporting as the latest major action of
S. 1874 that it was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on October 17, 2005)
(last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
79 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (plurality
opinion).
80 See id. at 831-32.
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case adopting it. Doing so will help illuminate the types of claims that
a plaintiff could potentially bring under the ATS and how prudential
exhaustion would limit such claims.
A. The History of Sarei v. Rio Tinto
In 2000, Alexis Holyweek Sarei and twenty-one other residents of
Papua New Guinea filed a class-action lawsuit against Rio Tinto, PLC,
and Rio Tinto Limited (collectively, Rio Tinto).81 The plaintiffs al-
leged seven separate violations of the ATS that stemmed from actions
taken by Rio Tinto and the Papua New Guinea army while Rio Tinto
operated copper mines on the island of Bougainville.82 The allega-
tions stated that Rio Tinto had committed "crimes against humanity;
war crimes/murder; violation of the rights to life, health, and security
of the person; racial discrimination; cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment; violation of international environmental rights; and a con-
sistent pattern of gross violations of human rights."8 3
In 1967, Rio Tinto secured the rights to operate mines on Bou-
gainville and established Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL).84
While constructing the mine, Rio Tinto allegedly paid workers from
the local population, who were black, lower wages than the nonlocal
workers that Rio Tinto brought to the island.85 According to the
plaintiffs in Sarei, after visiting the mine in 1969 the Australian Minis-
ter of Labor "purportedly accused Rio Tinto of paying black workers
'slave wages.' "86
Operations at the Panguna Mine began in 1972.87 The mining
operation produced a large quantity of waste rock and tailings, which,
allegedly, were dumped into the local Kawerong-Jaba river system.88
The dumping purportedly decimated both vegetation in the River Val-
ley and the fish population in the Empress Augusta Bay.89 The mine
allegedly produced air pollution that resulted in an increase of respir-
81 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd in part,
rev'd in part, and vacated in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), withdrawn and superseded on
reh'g, 487 F.3d 1193, 1208 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008)
(plurality opinion).
82 See id. at 1127-28.
83 Id. at 1127.
94 See id. at 1121-22.
85 Id. at 1124.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1122. For an aerial image of the mine, see GOOGLE MAPs, http://
maps.google.com (search "Panguna, Bougainville, Papua New Guinea"; then click "Satel-
lite" button) (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). Also visible from this photograph is the devegeta-
tion along the Kawerong-Jaba River Valley allegedly caused by the dumping of rock and
tailings into the river.
88 Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
89 Id.
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atory infections and asthma amongst the local population.o The pol-
lution also allegedly "changed the island's climate, damaged its crops,
caused fish to develop ulcerations and die, and forced many animals
out of their habitats."91
In 1988, the mine was closed in response to violent protests by
some Bougainvilleans.92 At that time, the head of BCL allegedly told
the government of Papua New Guinea that Rio Tinto would "recon-
sider future investment in [the country] in light of . .. the acts of
terrorism."93 The plaintiffs alleged that this threat caused the govern-
ment to use military force to quell the uprising and that Rio Tinto
assisted the army by transporting troops.9 4 The army's actions in-
cluded the killing of many Bougainvilleans on February 14, 1990.95
The killings triggered a consolidation of the Bougainville Revolu-
tionary Army (BRA).96 Over the next ten years, the BRA fought a civil
war for independence against the Papua New Guinea army.9 7 A block-
ade-allegedly supported by Rio Tinto-was imposed on the island in
1990."1 The blockade prevented medical and other essential supplies
from reaching the island, and the Red Cross estimated that it led to
the death of over 2,000 children between 1990 and 1992.99 The plain-
tiffs alleged that the army committed human rights violations, includ-
ing attacks on civilian populations, throughout the conflict.100 An
estimated 15,000 civilians were killed during the war.101 The plaintiffs
argued that Rio Tinto caused the government to use military force
and that this made it responsible for the army's actions.10 2
When the plaintiffs brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, the defendants sought to dismiss the
claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.10 3 The district court held
that only the plaintiffs' claims of the violation of the rights to life,
health, and security of the person; cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment; and a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights
90 Id. at 1123-24.
91 Id. at 1123.
92 See id. at 1125; DAVIS, supra note 30, at 108.
93 Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
94 Id. at 1125-26.
95 Id. at 1126.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1127.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1128.
103 Id. at 1120.
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should be dismissed on these grounds. 10 4 However, it also deter-
mined that all of the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed as nonjusti-
ciable under the political question doctrine and that the claim of
racial discrimination and the claim of environmental torts each
should be dismissed on act-of-state and international comity
grounds.1 0 5 In response to the defendant's argument that the ATS
required exhaustion, the court stated that it did not.1 0 6
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling
that the plaintiffs claims constituted nonjusticiable political ques-
tions.107 It also vacated the district court's ruling regarding racial dis-
crimination and violations of international environmental rights.1 08
Lastly, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the ATS does
not require exhaustion of claims. 09 The court spoke at length about
exhaustion because Rio Tinto cross-appealed arguing for the require-
ment of exhaustion under the ATS. 1'0 It concluded that, absent any
guidance by Congress or the Supreme Court, lower courts should not
read exhaustion into the ATS.'11
B. En Banc Panel Decides on Prudential Exhaustion
The following year, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reheard
the case to address the issue of exhaustion.11 2 In light of the Supreme
Court's statement in Sosa that it would "consider [the exhaustion] re-
quirement in an appropriate case,"s13 the Ninth Circuit decided that
Sarez was "an appropriate case for such consideration under both do-
mestic prudential standards and core principles of international
law." 114 In a fractured decision, a three-judge plurality-joined by a
threejudge concurrence'I 5-held that the ATS should require a case-
by-case determination regarding exhaustion (prudential exhaus-
tion).116 Where nexus to the United States is weak, district courts
"should carefully consider the question of exhaustion, particularly-
but not exclusively-with respect to claims that do not involve matters
104 See id. at 1208.
105 Id. at 1208-09.
106 Id. at 1139.
107 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1208 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 550
F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (plurality opinion).
108 See id. at 1210.
109 Id. at 1223.
11o See id. at 1213-23.
I1I See id. at 1223.
112 Sarei, 550 F.3d at 824.
113 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
114 Sarei, 550 F.3d at 827.
115 See id. at 833 (Bea, J., joined by Callahan, J., concurring); id. at 840 (Kleinfeld,J.,
concurring).
116 See id. at 824 (plurality opinion).
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of 'universal concern.""' 7 The defendant bears the burden of prov-
ing that exhaustion is required. 11 If the court finds that exhaustion is
required, the plaintiff must obtain a final decision from the highest
court in the country where the claim arose or demonstrate that seek-
ing redress in that country would be futile.1"9 Only after the plaintiff
has done so can the plaintiff bring a suit under the ATS in the Ninth
Circuit.
The plurality defined claims of "universal concern" as including
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture;120 in other words,
acts that are accepted as peremptory norms.121 By advising district
courts to consider exhaustion particularly for claims that are not of
"universal concern," the Ninth Circuit suggested that the exhaustion
requirement is appropriate both where the plaintiff does not allege a
violation of a peremptory norm and where nexus to the United States
is weak.122
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to de-
termine which of the plaintiffs' claims required exhaustion.' 23 Given
the nature of the claims and the parties involved, the district court
held that nexus to the United States was weak.' 24 The district court
then analyzed each of the plaintiffs' claims to determine whether or
not they were of universal concern.125 Relying mainly on decisions
made in previous ATS cases about the universality of an act, the court
determined that the claims of crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and racial discrimination were of universal concern.126 It also deter-
mined that the remaining claims-violations of the right to life,
health, and security; violations of international environmental rights;
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; and a consistent pattern of
gross violations of human rights-were not of universal concern.127
117 Id. at 831. In determining whether the allegations have "significant" "nexus" to the
United States, the Ninth Circuit considers "the traditional bases for exercising our sover-
eign jurisdiction to prescribe laws, namely nationality, territory, and effects within the
United States." Id.
118 Id. at 832. I take it as a given that a defendant would almost always plead exhaus-
tion. There is little reason to believe that a defendant would not use it as an affirmative
defense once the defendant realizes it is not automatic.
119 Id.
120 See id. at 831 ("Some of the claims-torture, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes-may implicate matters of 'universal concern,' generally described as offenses 'for
which a state has jurisdiction to punish without regard to territoriality or the nationality of
the offenders.'" (quoting Kadic v. Karadli, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995))).
121 See infra Part III.A.
122 See Sarei, 550 F.3d at 831.
123 Id. at 832.
124 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1018 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
125 Id. at 1022-30.
126 Id. at 1030-31.
127 Id. at 1024-26, 1028-30.
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After determining which claims were not matters of universal
concern, the district court determined which of those claims would be
subject to the exhaustion requirement. In balancing the factors of
nexus and universal concern, the court held that only the claims that
were not of universal concern required exhaustion. 128 In a status re-
port to the district court, the plaintiffs decided to drop their claims
that were not of universal concern so that the remaining claims could
proceed.129 After nearly a decade of litigation, the plaintiffs' case was
finally able to move forward.
III
BENEFITS OF PRUDENTIAL ExHAUSTION
In Part II, I presented the history of Sarei. While discussing Sarei,
I provided an overview of the concept of prudential exhaustion. In
this Part, I will argue that prudential exhaustion is the best way to
fulfill the Supreme Court's directives in Sosa and that other circuit
courts should adopt the Ninth Circuit's prudential exhaustion frame-
work for claims under the ATS. I will construct my argument by ex-
plaining why claims of violations of peremptory norms should
generally not require exhaustion and why claims of violations of all
other norms of customary international law should require exhaus-
tion, particularly if the nexus to the United States is weak. First,
though, to comprehend why courts should require prudential exhaus-
tion under the ATS, it is necessary to understand the definition of
peremptory norm.
A. Peremptory Norms
Peremptory norms, also referred to as jus cogens, constitute a sub-
set of customary international law.130 As opposed to general norms of
customary international law, peremptory norms are binding on all
states, regardless of whether the state has consented to the norm.' 3
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines peremptory
norms as norms "accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
128 Id. at 1030-31.
129 See Plaintiffs' Status Report at 2, Sarei, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (No. 00-11695).
130 See HENNER, supra note 2, at 126-27.
131 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. k (1987) ("Some rules of international law are recognized by the international com-
munity of states as peremptory, permitting no derogation. These rules prevail over and
invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with
them. Such a peremptory norm is subject to modification only by a subsequent norm of
international law having the same character."); id. § 702 cmt. n (stating that agreements
that violate peremptory norms are void).
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general international law having the same character."132 These strin-
gent characteristics restrict what norms qualify as peremptory.
There is no set category of peremptory norms, but the term is
usually reserved for a limited set of actions. The Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States lists the following ac-
tions as violations of peremptory norms: "(a) genocide, (b) slavery or
slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individu-
als, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial
discrimination."13 3 In ATS cases, various federal courts have referred
to acts of genocide, slavery, torture, crimes against humanity, and ex-
trajudicial killing as violations of peremptory norms.' 3 4 Although
courts and commentators have different views of exactly what can con-
stitute a violation of a peremptory norm, it is clear that the term en-
compasses only a few actions. Many, but not all, claims under the ATS
are of violations of peremptory norms. For example, as noted in the
previous Part, the Ninth Circuit in Sarei referred to torture, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes as claims of universal concern;135
and on remand, the district court determined that the plaintiffs'
claims of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and racial discrimina-
tion were of universal concern.136 There is no requirement that
claims under the ATS be claims of violations of peremptory norms;
132 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
133 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702(a)-(f); id. § 702 cmt. n (establishing that those human rights norms listed in clauses
(a) through (f) are peremptory norms); see also id. § 102 reporters' note 6 ("Although the
concept of jus cogens is now accepted, its content is not agreed. . . . Such norms might
include rules prohibiting genocide, slave trade and slavery, apartheid and other gross viola-
tions of human rights, and perhaps attacks on diplomats.").
134 See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)
("The universal and fundamental rights of human beings identified by Nuremberg-rights
against genocide, enslavement, and other inhumane acts-are the direct ancestors of the
universal and fundamental norms recognized as jus cogens." (citation omitted)); Comm. of
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (listing the acts
prohibited by section 702 of Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 333
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Jus cogens norms include the prohibition on genocide, torture, slav-
ery, crimes against humanity, and extrajudicial killing."); Hirsh v. State of Israel, 962 F.
Supp. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Committee of United States Citizens, 859 F.2d at 941,
for what constitutes peremptory norms); see also United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d
754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Kidnapping also does not qualify as a jus cogens norm, such
that its commission would be justiciable in our courts even absent a domestic
law.... [K]idnapping does not rise to the level of other jus cogens norms, such as torture,
murder, genocide, and slavery.").
135 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (plurality
opinion).
136 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1030-31 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and racial discrimination are "jus cogens violations that form the
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however, the ATS cases suggest that, at a minimum, all violations of
peremptory norms do constitute cognizable ATS claims.' 37
In Sarei, the Ninth Circuit did not create a categorical rule that
district courts must require exhaustion for all claims of violations of
general customary international law, except for claims of violations of
peremptory norms.138 Rather, the circuit court leaves open the possi-
bility that in certain cases a plaintiff may have to exhaust claims of
violations of peremptory norms-even though the court does not clar-
ify when this would occur.' 3 9 Nonetheless, the court implicitly sug-
gests that exhaustion is advisable for claims of violations of
nonperemptory norms.140 The court seems to suggest that lower
courts should require exhaustion more frequently for violations of
customary international laws that are not peremptory norms than for
violations of those that are.
It is important at this juncture to recognize a distinction between
claims of violations of peremptory norms and claims of violations of
other customary international laws. Doing so is consistent with the
Supreme Court's directive that district courts act as vigilant doorkeep-
ers.'14 That is, claims of violations of peremptory norms should not
be subject to the same rigorous procedure as claims of violations of
other customary international law for many reasons. These reasons
also establish the basis for arguing that the ATS should not require
exhaustion of all claims.
First, in Sosa the Court stated that claims brought under the ATS
must be violations of widely accepted norms that are definite in char-
acter. 142 By definition, claims of violations of peremptory norms fit
this criterion better than other claims do. Peremptory norms consti-
tute a select group of norms under customary international law that
least controversial core of modern day [ATS] jurisdiction"), vacated ent banc, 550 F.3d 822
(9th Cir. 2008) (plurality opinion).
137 SeeHENNER, supra note 2, at 128; KOEBELE, supra note 23, at 22-23. The purpose of
this Note is to advocate for an approach that limits claims under the ATS. Prudential
exhaustion does not limit ATS claims to claims of violations of peremptory norms, and I
argue that it should not. However, prudential exhaustion does prevent the class of claims
under the ATS from easily growing, which I argue is necessary.
138 Instead, the court merely "counsels" that "where the United States 'nexus' is weak,
courts should carefully consider the question of exhaustion, particularly-but not exclu-
sively-with respect to claims that do not involve matters of 'universal concern.'" Sarei, 550
F.3d at 831.
139 See id. at 831-32.
140 See id. at 831.
141 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
142 See id. at 732 ("[W]e are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private
claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms fa-
miliar when § 1350 was enacted.").
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are definite in nature and almost universally accepted. 1 4 3 Despite the
Supreme Court's unclear limitations on ATS claims, claims of viola-
tions of peremptory norms are almost certainly included in the cate-
gory of claims that are available to ATS plaintiffs without exhaustion.
Although mandatory exhaustion would not make it impossible
for a plaintiff to bring claims of violations of peremptory norms under
the ATS, the Supreme Court rejected mandatory exhaustion by stating
that it would consider the "requirement in an appropriate case." 144 If
the lower courts were to require exhaustion of claims of violations of
peremptory norms, one would assume that they would generally re-
quire exhaustion of all claims of violations of the laws of nations be-
cause peremptory norms "form the least controversial core"145 of ATS
claims and "enjoy[ ] the highest status within international law."146
Taking these propositions together leads to the conclusion that re-
quiring exhaustion for claims of violations of peremptory norms
would contravene the Supreme Court's rejection of mandatory
exhaustion.
Second, because of the universal nature of peremptory norms,
every state properly has the right to hear claims of violations of per-
emptory norms if it establishes a jurisdictional mechanism for doing
so. In an example of universal jurisdiction-the criminal case against
Adolf Eichmann for his involvement in the Holocaust-the Supreme
Court of Israel confronted this issue. It stated: "[I] t is the universal
character of the crimes in question which vests in every state the
power to try those who participated in the perpetration of such crimes
and to punish them . . ."147 Because of the universal character of
peremptory norms, the United States is properly vested with the au-
thority to hear such claims. The ATS creates the mechanism for estab-
lishing jurisdiction to do so in civil cases. Unlike the TVPA, which also
establishes jurisdiction for hearing claims of the violation of certain
peremptory norms, 148 the ATS does not include an explicit exhaus-
tion requirement.
Third, it is improper to read an exhaustion requirement into the
ATS for peremptory norms when neither the statute itself nor the leg-
islative record express an intent to require exhaustion. The Supreme
143 See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
144 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
145 See HENNER, supra note 2, at 126 (quoting Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193,
1202 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (plurality opinion)).
146 See id. at 127 (quoting Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
147 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: NoRMs, AcTORS, PROCESs 380 (2d
ed. 2006) (providing excerpts from the Israeli Supreme Court's rejection of Adolf Eich-
mann's challenge to Israel's jurisdiction).
148 See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codi-
fied in a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
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Court has instructed that "the initial question whether exhaustion is
required should be answered by reference to congressional intent."149
In the original appeal to the Ninth Circuit in Sarei, the circuit court
noted that the legislative record for the ATS is completely nonexis-
tent.150 In his dissent in that case, Judge Jay Bybee pointed to the Jay
Treaty with Great Britain, which was signed in 1794 and included an
exhaustion requirement, as proof that the first Congress was aware of
exhaustion.151 Judge Bybee argued that at the time Congress passed
the ATS, exhaustion was common practice and, therefore, the court
should read that requirement into the ATS.15 2 This argument's flaw,
however, is, as the majority points out, that Congress may have pur-
posefully decided not to include an exhaustion requirement in the
ATS.' 5s Without any congressional record on the issue, it is impossi-
ble to know Congress's intent.
In addition, the argument's weaknesses are apparent when one
contrasts the ATS and the Jay Treaty. If the ATS was originally
thought of as establishing jurisdiction for offenses against ambassa-
dors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy-as the Court stated in
Sosa 154 -then it established jurisdiction for offenses that could not be
redressed in any other jurisdiction. Exhaustion, therefore, would be
futile because there would not be other forums in which to exhaust
the claims. In contrast, the Jay Treaty "created an international arbi-
tration procedure for pre-Revolutionary War debts claimed by British
creditors against American debtors."155 The courts already existed as
a separate forum for British creditors. The Jay Treaty created a new
forum for redress only if ordinary court procedures proved futile.156
Since no forum already existed for the original ATS claims, the Jay
Treaty fails to serve as a proper comparison for the argument that one
should read exhaustion into the ATS.
Some have also argued that courts should read exhaustion into
the ATS because Congress required exhaustion for claims brought
under the TVPA.157 The TVPA provides a cause of action for claims
149 Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1982) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and justifying this test with the argument that "Congress is vested with the power to pre-
scribe the basic procedural scheme under which claims may be heard in federal courts.").
150 See Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1215.
151 See id. at 1231-32 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
152 See id. at 1231-32, 1231 n.8.
153 See id. at 1215, 1218 (majority opinion); id. at 1231 n.8 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
154 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004).
155 Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1215.
156 See Note, The Alien Tort Statute, Forum Shopping, and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Norm, 121 HARV. L. REv. 2110, 2122-23 (2008) (noting this differentiation between the
ATS and the Jay Treaty).
157 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified
in a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)); see Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1229-30 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
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of torture and extrajudicial killing as defined by the Act. 15 8 Court
opinions and legislative history indicate that the purpose of the TVPA
was to supplement, not substitute for, the ATS.' 5 9 Congress's intent
regarding exhaustion is quite clear in the TVPA: "A court shall decline
to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted
adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct
giving rise to the claim occurred."o6 0 The issue with using the TVPA
as a basis for arguing that the ATS requires exhaustion is that the legis-
lative record for the TVPA does not mention expanding exhaustion to
the ATS. In addition, the passage of the ATS and the TVPA are sepa-
rated by over two hundred years. One should not use congressional
intent in the passage of the TVPA to read congressional intent into
the passage of the ATS.16e
The exhaustion clause in the TVPA reinforces the second reason
why a plaintiff should not have to exhaust remedies for violations of
peremptory norms under the ATS. As stated above, peremptory
norms are universal in nature. Any nation can hear violations of per-
emptory norms as long as there exists a jurisdictional mechanism for
doing so, which the ATS is.16 2 The TVPA suggests a clear congres-
sional intent for limiting jurisdiction for claims under the TVPA by
requiring exhaustion. As noted, no such clear expression of congres-
sional intent exists for the ATS. Therefore, the standard should be
that the ATS has jurisdiction without the limitation imposed by ex-
haustion for violations of peremptory norms until Congress makes its
desire for an exhaustion requirement clear. If one must use the TVPA
as a comparison to the ATS, the TVPA undoubtedly supports the con-
clusion that no exhaustion of claims of violations of peremptory
norms is necessary unless congressional intent evinces otherwise. Al-
though the Ninth Circuit's opinion correctly leaves open the possibil-
ity that courts can require exhaustion for such claims,' 6 3 for the
preceding reasons, courts should do so rarely.
B. Customary International Law
The reasons why exhaustion should not be a requirement for
claims of violations of peremptory norms also underlie the argument
for why exhaustion should be a requirement for claims of violations of
all other norms of customary international law. Customary interna-
tional law consists of practices that a general consensus of states fol-
158 See sources cited supra note 157.
159 See HENNER, supra note 2, at 93-94.
160 Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(b).
161 See Note, supra note 156, at 2123-24; see also HENNER, supra note 2, at 93-96.
162 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
163 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (plurality
opinion).
2011] 1293
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lows out of a sense of legal obligation.16 4 Unlike peremptory norms (a
subset of customary international law), which do not allow deroga-
tion, customary international laws that are not peremptory norms are
based on consent. States do not have to adhere to a practice if they
make their opposition known during the development of the custom-
ary international law.165 The list of norms that constitute customary
international law is much more fluid than the list that constitutes per-
emptory norms; it is also much more open to debate.
First and foremost, courts should require plaintiffs to exhaust
claims of violations of customary international law that do not rise to
the level of peremptory norms because doing so fulfills the Supreme
Court's mandate in Sosa that district courts act as vigilant doorkeep-
ers.1 66 The Court wanted to limit the expansion of the ATS by reduc-
ing the claims that a plaintiff could bring.16 7 Prudential exhaustion
works to reduce claims. It does not necessarily settle whether a
nonperemptory norm of customary international law rises to the level
of specificity that is necessary under Sosa's reading of the ATS; 68 how-
ever, by reducing the number of claims brought under the ATS, pru-
dential exhaustion guarantees that courts will have fewer
opportunities to expand the group of claims accepted under the ATS.
This approach effectively forces courts to act as vigilant doorkeepers.
As compared to the analysis that the Second Circuit used in Abdul-
lahi,169 the additional procedure of prudential exhaustion guards
against the expansion of the ATS, which, if unchecked, could end with
courts determining that any violation of a customary international law
constitutes a viable claim under the ATS.
When plaintiffs bring claims of violations of peremptory norms
and customary international law, prudential exhaustion may entice
them to drop their general customary international law claims so they
can pursue their other claims without delay. With Sarei as an example,
once the district court determined that the plaintiffs' nonperemptory-
norm claims required exhaustion, the plaintiffs decided to drop those
claims so that the peremptory-norm claims could proceed un-
164 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987).
165 See id. § 102 cmt. d ("Although customary law may be built by the acquiescence as
well as by the actions of states and become generally binding on all states, in principle a
state that indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of develop-
ment is not bound by that rule even after it matures." (citation omitted)); id. § 102 report-
ers' note 2 ("That a rule of customary law is not binding on any state indicating its dissent
during the development of the rule is an accepted application of the traditional principle
that international law essentially depends on the consent of states." (citation omitted)).
166 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
167 See id.
168 See id. at 725.
169 See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2009).
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hindered.170 If plaintiffs bring fewer nonperemptory-norm claims,
courts will have fewer opportunities to expand what claims plaintiffs
can bring. Thus, whether a plaintiff brings only claims of violations of
customary international law or claims of violations of both customary
international law and peremptory norms, prudential exhaustion helps
to fulfill the Supreme Court's intent of leaving the door "ajar subject
to vigilant doorkeeping."17'
Second, there is no argument that exhaustion for claims of viola-
tions of nonperemptory norms of customary international law defies
congressional intent. Mandatory exhaustion of all ATS claims would
have the equivalent effect of legislation requiring exhaustion of all
ATS claims. The Supreme Court has instructed, however, that a
"court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal
statute unless it is consistent with [congressional] intent."172 Alterna-
tively, because prudential exhaustion leaves the requirement of ex-
haustion in the hands of district court judges-and, as I have argued,
should be used sparingly for claims of violations of peremptory
norms-congressional intent should not be required. Prudential ex-
haustion is not meant to change jurisdiction under the ATS; rather, it
is meant to serve a gate-keeping function based on the principles of
comity.17 3 This is especially true in light of the fact that the first step
under a prudential exhaustion analysis is the determination of nexus
to the United States. This leaves the decision of exhaustion in the
hands of district court judges. In so doing, prudential exhaustion op-
erates similarly to other devices that dictate the timing of federal-court
decision making.174 For this reason, prudential exhaustion can be
read into a statute that grants courts jurisdiction to hear specific
claims without the requirement of congressional intent.
Third, prudential exhaustion of claims of violations of nonper-
emptory norms of customary international law promotes comity.1 75 As
noted, the category of nonperemptory norms of customary interna-
tional law is not as stable as the category of peremptory norms. By
requiring exhaustion, the country where the event occurred has the
170 Plaintiffs' Status Report, supra note 129.
171 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
172 See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1982).
173 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 828-29 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (plurality
opinion).
174 See id. at 828 ("Judicially-imposed or prudential exhaustion is not a prerequisite to
the exercise ofjurisdiction, but rather is 'one among related doctrines-including absten-
tion, finality, and ripeness-that govern the timing of federal-court decisionmaking.'"
(quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992))).
175 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) ("[Comity] is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.").
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first opportunity to address the claim. That country will determine
whether the claim is a violation of a customary international law. Pru-
dential exhaustion thus limits the reach of district courts because dis-
trict courts will only begin to determine whether a plaintiff may bring
a claim of a customary international law violation under the ATS if a
proper forum does not exist. Internationally this benefits the United
States by promoting the image that it respects the decisions made by
other judicial systems. In addition, underlying the Court's reasoning
in Sosa is the belief that the judiciary should avoid interfering with
U.S. foreign policy, which is properly under the control of the execu-
tive and legislative branches. 176 Requiring a plaintiff to exhaust a
claim of a violation of customary international law complies with this
caution by minimizing interference. The fewer claims of violations of
customary international law that a court hears, the fewer opportuni-
ties it has to reach determinations that have an effect on U.S. foreign
relations and the internal politics of foreign nations.
Fourth, while promoting comity, prudential exhaustion does not
completely bar a plaintiff from seeking redress. Remedies in the
country where the act occurred must be "available, effective, and not
futile."'77 If these conditions do not exist, then the plaintiff can pro-
ceed with the claim under the ATS. This leaves the door slightly
ajar 78 for claims of violations of customary international law. Human
rights, therefore, are not simply abandoned when violations do not
rise to the level of peremptory norms. Prudential exhaustion is con-
cerned with such violations, but it balances them against the interest
in comity. If a foreign court proves inadequate, the ATS remains a
viable option. As noted earlier, though, this does not solve the issue
of whether a claim is cognizable under the ATS, but it limits the num-
ber of claims a district court will hear; thus, district courts will have
fewer opportunities to expand the reach of the ATS. In this sense,
prudential exhaustion of claims of violations of customary interna-
tional law fulfills an original goal of the ATS: providing a forum in the
federal district courts when no other forum exists.179
The structure of prudential exhaustion recommended by the
Ninth Circuit affords further advantages, including providing court
decisions with additional legitimacy. In a speech at Vanderbilt Univer-
sity Law School in 2008, John Bellinger III, former legal adviser to the
secretary of state, stated that the ATS offers three major benefits:
176 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
177 Sarei, 550 F.3d at 832 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATEs § 703 cmt. d (1987); id. § 713 cmt. f).
178 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
179 See id. at 720.
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First, is that ATS suits can promote accountability and provide a pub-
lic voice to victims of terrible human rights abuses when no other
forum is available.... Second, is that ATS litigation may help to raise
public and political awareness of human rights abuses that might
not gain attention otherwise.... Third, ATS litigation might ad-
vance U.S. participation in the development of customary interna-
tional law. 80
Prudential exhaustion advances each of these three benefits. First,
the victims of violations of human rights retain their public voice and
can seek redress under the ATS if no other forum exists. Human
rights abuses will continue to garner attention. If the violation is one
of peremptory norms, the United States exists as an available forum
without exhaustion. If the violation is not of a peremptory norm and
the country where the claims occurred does not provide "available,
effective, and not futile"181 means of redress, then the United States
possibly will. In either event, the victims retain the ability to seek
meaningful redress and to use this opportunity to call notice to the
abuses they suffered.
Second, prudential exhaustion provides an additional advantage:
if claims proceed under the ATS, human rights abuses will gain atten-
tion and will not have to compete with arguments that a local court
should have rightfully heard the claim. By determining that a proper
local forum does not exist or that the violation is one of a peremptory
norm, prudential exhaustion dulls the argument that United States
courts are overreaching by hearing a case. It adds legitimacy to argue
that a district court is only hearing a case because the claim is a viola-
tion of a peremptory norm or because local remedies proved illusory.
Finally, prudential exhaustion continues to allow the federal
courts to participate in the development of customary international
law but with the understanding that the country where such actions
occurred should have the first opportunity to address the claims.
Since customary international law is based on international consent,
such an approach actually enhances the goal of developing customary
international law by offering other nations the opportunity to demon-
strate their consent to a practice. Providing redress for violations of
an action strengthens a nation's commitment to adhering to that
practice. If redress proves futile, U.S. district courts remain a forum
in which the plaintiff can argue that a certain action violated the laws
of nations. By considering concerns of comity, prudential exhaustion
provides additional legitimacy both to customary international law
and to the determinations that district courts reach in ATS cases. Ad-
180 Bellinger, supra note 59, at 7-8.
181 See supra note 177.
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ding a requirement of prudential exhaustion therefore enhances the
three benefits of the ATS that Bellinger discussed.
IV
CONFRONTING POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES OF
PRUDENTIAL EXI-AUSTION
Although prudential exhaustion fulfills the goals the Supreme
Court listed in Sosa, it does have weaknesses. By confronting these
limitations, it will become apparent that even though prudential ex-
haustion is not perfect, it is the best solution currently available. Its
shortcomings should not prevent other circuit courts from adopting
prudential exhaustion in the absence of further action by the Su-
preme Court or Congress.
A. Mandatory Exhaustion
As mentioned in the previous Part, some have advocated for ex-
haustion of all claims before a plaintiff can bring a claim under the
ATS. 182 This approach to exhaustion would certainly better fulfill the
goal of comity than prudential exhaustion because it would always
provide the relevant local judicial system an opportunity to address
the plaintiffs claims before the plaintiff could bring the claim under
the ATS. Mandatory exhaustion would also further remove district
courts from involving themselves in U.S. foreign policy, which the Su-
preme Court provided as a reason for courts to proceed with caution
in ATS cases.183
The problem with this approach, though, is that there is no con-
gressional mandate stating that exhaustion must be a requirement of
ATS litigation. There is no mandate from the Supreme Court either.
When the Supreme Court addressed exhaustion in Sosa, it did so by
stating that it would "consider [it] in an appropriate case." 184 Until
the Court or Congress addresses exhaustion, there is no basis for argu-
ing that exhaustion of all claims is or should be required. In addition,
given the Court's mandate that exhaustion must be based on congres-
sional intent,'85 such an approach would actually contradict the
182 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1225-26, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (By-
beeJ, dissenting), vacated en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (plurality opinion); Bellin-
ger, supra note 59, at 12-13; Popova, supra note 69, at 2 (arguing that "despite the Ninth
Circuit's majority opinion in Sarei, the exhaustion requirement is a universal and binding
norm which should not be severed from the traditional law of nations as applied in Ameri-
can courts through the [ATS]").
183 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
184 Id. at 733 n.21.
185 Cf Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1982) ("[Clourts play an impor-
tant role in determining the limits of an exhaustion requirement and may impose such a
requirement even where Congress has not expressly so provided. However, the initial
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Court's current stance. Although prudential exhaustion does not ful-
fill Sosa's goals to the extent that mandatory exhaustion would, with-
out more guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court, there
simply is no option of mandatory exhaustion. 8 6
B. Lack of Mandate for Nonperemptory Norms
Prudential exhaustion, as described by the Ninth Circuit, does
not require district courts to demand exhaustion for all claims that
are not of "universal concern."1 8 7 Instead, when nexus to the United
States is weak, the Ninth Circuit asks courts to "carefully consider the
question of exhaustion, particularly-but not exclusively-with re-
spect to claims that do not involve matters of 'universal concern.'"
1 8 8
One can argue that without mandatory exhaustion, at least for
nonperemptory norms, district courts will ignore the Ninth Circuit's
directive. 189 In other words, by providing district courts discretion,
prudential exhaustion does not solve the problem of the unchecked
ability of district courts to expand the ATS.
It is true that the Ninth Circuit provided district courts with dis-
cretion over whether to apply exhaustion. However, by definition,
under prudential exhaustion judges must retain the ability to decide
what claims require exhaustion. Without a congressional mandate,
the Ninth Circuit could not require district courts to apply exhaus-
tion. Given this fact, requiring district courts to determine whether to
apply exhaustion was as forceful an exhaustion mandate as the Ninth
Circuit could prescribe.
Like the Sosa Court, though, the Ninth Circuit filled its opinion
with reasoning demanding caution by district courts, 9 0 and much of
the court's reasoning is grounded in concerns for comity.191 How-
ever, what the Ninth Circuit's prudential exhaustion standard offers,
and the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa lacks, is clear guidance.
The Ninth Circuit provides district courts with a concept they know
question whether exhaustion is required should be answered by reference to congressional
intent; and a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal statute
unless it is consistent with that intent.").
186 Senator Feinstein's proposed legislation, which never made it out of committee,
included an exhaustion requirement for all claims under the ATS. See S. 1874, 109th
Cong. § 2(d) (2005); supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
187 Sarei, 550 F.3d at 831.
188 Id.
189 Cf HENNER, supra note 2, at 371-72 ("It seems likely that an exhaustion analysis,
conducted as a matter of discretion, will consider the same factors that have traditionally
been considered as part of a forum non conveniens analysis. If so, the imposition of an
exhaustion requirement in ATS cases will have little, if any, practical effect, as the result
will be the same under either theory.").
190 See Sarei, 550 F.3d at 827-32.
191 See id. at 830-31.
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how to apply (exhaustion) and guided instructions on when to apply
it.1 9 2 Hopefully, such a clear set of directives will assist district courts
in applying prudential exhaustion. As I argued above, in Abdullahi,1as
the Second Circuit did not purposefully ignore Sosa's mandate by us-
ing a lenient standard for determining claims under the ATS;' 94
rather, it tried to implement the Supreme Court's vague standard. Al-
ternatively, prudential exhaustion's clarity and simplicity of applica-
tion would help to ensure that courts do not lose sight of their vigilant
doorkeeping responsibility.
The fact that prudential exhaustion does not solve the problem
of district court discretion is a weakness of the doctrine that should
not be dismissed; it is perhaps its greatest limitation. Nevertheless, the
clarity of the directive might provide sufficient incentive to persuade
the district courts to apply an exhaustion analysis.
C. Comparison with Forum Non Conveniens
In his book, Human Rights and the Alien Tort Statute, Peter Henner
argues that prudential exhaustion will have no practical effect because
courts already have the authority to dismiss an ATS case under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 195 Henner's argument is pre-
mised on the assumption that district courts will consider the factors
used to determine whether to dismiss under forum non conveniens
when determining whether to impose exhaustion.196 He goes on to
argue that the factors are the same and, thus, the doctrine of pruden-
tial exhaustion does not limit the amount of claims under the ATS in
any manner that forum non conveniens does not already.
The factors used to determine forum non conveniens, though,
are not the same as those used to determine whether or not to impose
exhaustion. The doctrines are similar in that both require that an
alternative forum be adequate and available.' 97 If there is an ade-
quate and available alternative forum under forum non conveniens,
the district court makes its determination regarding dismissal by bal-
ancing factors involving private interests of the parties and public in-
192 See id. at 831-32; see also supra text accompanying notes 112-22.
193 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
194 See id. at 176-77; supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
195 See HENNER, supra note 2, at 371-72.
196 See id.
197 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) ("At the outset of any
forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative
forum. Ordinarily, this requirement will be satisfied when the defendant is 'amenable to
process' in the other jurisdiction. In rare circumstances, however, where the remedy of-
fered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate
alternative, and the initial requirement may not be satisfied." (citation omitted)); Sarei, 550
F.3d at 832.
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terests.198 Private interests include access to evidence, access to
witnesses, issues of expense, and enforceability of a judgment.199 Pub-
lic interests include the burden on the U.S. court, the burden of jury
duty on the community when the events occurred elsewhere, and the
interest in having issues decided where they occurred. 200 Under pru-
dential exhaustion, however, the district court makes a determination
based on whether the matter is one of universal concern when nexus
to the United States is weak;201 the enforceability of the judgment is
the only private and public interest considered because "the remedy
must be available, effective, and not futile."202 Since the basis for the
determination for dismissal under the two doctrines is different, Hen-
ner's assumption-and, consequently, conclusion-is incorrect.
There is, however, a more fundamental difference between fo-
rum non conveniens and prudential exhaustion that undermines the
argument that the two serve the same function in the context of the
ATS. Forum non conveniens only allows a federal court to dismiss a
claim over which it has subject-matter jurisdiction;203 therefore,
before dismissing, a court must first determine whether it has jurisdic-
tion to hear the claim. If a court determines that it does not, then
there would be no need to dismiss under forum non conveniens
grounds. Thus, unlike prudential exhaustion, forum non conveniens
does not help to fulfill the doorkeeping mandate stated in Sosa be-
cause the courts are still determining what claims plaintiffs can and
cannot bring under the ATS even if they are dismissing the action.
The possible reach of the ATS will expand even if individual cases are
dismissed.
Exhaustion, in contrast, allows a federal court to dismiss a claim
before it determines whether or not it has jurisdiction over the claim
under the ATS. If a court dismisses a claim under exhaustion, juris-
diction is not determined until, and only if, other available remedies
have proven futile.204 The postponement of an assessment regarding
jurisdiction for claims that are not of universal concern when nexus to
the United States is weak provides all of the benefits discussed in Part
III. Because forum non conveniens forces a court to reach a conclu-
sion regarding jurisdiction before dismissal, that doctrine does not
198 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
199 Id. at 508.
200 Id. at 508-09.
201 See Sarei, 550 F.3d at 831.
202 Id. at 832.
203 See Gulf Oil 330 U.S. at 504 ("Indeed the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never
apply if there is absence ofjurisdiction or mistake of venue."); see also Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc.,
399 F. Supp. 2d 495, 504-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (conducting a forum non conveniens analysis
but dismissing the claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
204 See Sarei, 550 F.3d at 832.
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provide these benefits. As a result, a significant difference exists be-
tween whether a court dismisses a claim under forum non conveniens
or under exhaustion. Although forum non conveniens is an impor-
tant and useful jurisdictional tool, it does not assist in effectively limit-
ing the scope of the ATS as prudential exhaustion does.
D. Hindering Development of Local Judicial Systems and
Hindering Redress for Victims
An additional argument against prudential exhaustion is that it
hinders the development of local judicial systems that could or should
handle such claims. If plaintiffs can bring claims of violations of per-
emptory norms in federal courts, then the plaintiffs are not bringing
such claims in the country where the violations occurred. As a result,
this approach possibly prevents those countries from developing the
necessary judicial mechanisms for hearing such claims. 205
In response, first, even if this argument is taken as correct, al-
though mandatory exhaustion would solve the concern that the ATS is
keeping claims from local courts, mandatory exhaustion is currently
not an option.206 Second, this approach completely sacrifices the in-
dividual plaintiff in the hope that doing so might spur human rights
development. Those who bring claims under the ATS are most often
from developing countries where a strong rule of law does not exist.2 0 7
For those who bring claims of violations of peremptory norms, what
guarantee is there that the same government that allowed such acts to
occur will allow the victims to seek redress? For instance, in Sarei,
many of the plaintiffs' claims against Rio Tinto stem from actions that
the corporation allegedly conducted with the consent of the local gov-
ernment or actions that the government allegedly took on behalf of
the corporation. 2 0 s Exhaustion would create an additional hurdle
and prolong the process of a judgment. If the plaintiffs had to ex-
haust their claims of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and racial
205 See Note, supra note 156, at 2129-30.
206 See supra Part IV.A.
207 See Kendra Magraw, Note, Universally Liable? Corporate-Complicity Liability Under the
Principle of UniversalJurisdiction, 18 MINN. J. INr'L L. 458, 482 (2009) ("Human-rights viola-
tions are most likely to occur in developing countries that are in need of investment and
that are eager to ensure that corporations do not look elsewhere to invest. These nations
are unlikely to have the resources to enforce national laws and might feel constrained from
doing so in order to ensure continued investment. The governments of such nations
might be more likely to engage in the types of practices that could expose a corporation to
liability . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
208 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122-27 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd in
part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), withdrawn and superseded
on reh'g, 487 F.3d 1193, 1208 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008)
(plurality opinion).
[Vol. 96:12731302
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
discrimination, how long would it take for their case to be heard in
the Central District of California, if ever?
For the purpose of human rights, because peremptory norms are
universal principles from which no derogation is allowed, the ATS
should stand for the principle that if plaintiffs were the victims of vio-
lations of peremptory norms, they can seek redress in the U.S. federal
court system without exhaustion. The violations themselves are what
allow for jurisdiction if the country creates a mechanism for hearing
the claims.209 Given this stance, corporations like Rio Tinto might
learn that violations of peremptory norms are unacceptable and that
they will be held accountable in a U.S. federal court for their deroga-
tion of such norms. This may keep corporations from investing in
countries, such as Papua New Guinea, that might commit violations of
peremptory norms in association with a corporation's investment. As
a result, this stance may incentivize these countries not to commit
such acts if they hope to attract or retain foreign investment.
Additionally, a case can be made that one cannot even trust a
nation that allowed violations of customary international law to pro-
vide a legitimate forum in which victims can seek redress for those
actions. For example, if the plaintiffs in Sarei brought their claims of
violations of customary international law in Papua New Guinea, their
efforts might have proven futile. Even though their claims are against
Rio Tinto and not the government of Papua New Guinea, most of the
claims arose out of the government's actions or the government's sup-
port of private actions. 210 At its extreme, this argument contends that
exhaustion stands in the way of victims seeking redress for any viola-
tions of customary international law and, therefore, exhaustion
should never be required. In other words, the interest in redress al-
ways outweighs the development of local courts, comity, and the con-
cern for foreign relations.
It may be true that a local remedy will prove futile, but in order to
limit the ATS and to promote comity, the plaintiff's interest cannot
always come first. Distinguishing between peremptory norms and
nonperemptory norms is a clear demarcation.21' It provides a point at
which concerns of comity should outweigh a plaintiffs interest and
vice versa. Perhaps the distinction means that sometimes an individ-
ual plaintiff will suffer because of delays and futile remedies. This un-
fortunate result, however, is necessary to limit the ATS consistent with
209 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
210 See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1126-27.
211 District courts have issued many ATS opinions that identify peremptory norms. See
supra note 134 and accompanying text. These cases can serve as a basis for future decisions
regarding what constitutes a peremptory norm in the same manner that previous ATS
cases serve as a basis for determining what constitutes a tort violating the law of nations.
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the Supreme Court's reasoning and mandate in Sosa. No limitation
would be possible if the plaintiffs interest in redress always out-
weighed concerns of comity. Such a policy would also cause a situa-
tion in which there would be no restraint-other than self-restraint-
on a district court's ability to involve itself in U.S. foreign policy.
As it currently stands in every circuit without prudential exhaus-
tion, district courts determine on their own whether to allow a claim
under the ATS. The guidance from Sosa is unclear and difficult to
implement in a consistent fashion. For these reasons, when the claim
is one that does not rise to the level of a violation of a peremptory
norm and the nexus to the United States is weak, the plaintiff should
exhaust the claim. Prudential exhaustion does not solve the problem
of how to determine whether a plaintiff may properly bring an ex-
hausted claim under the ATS, but it acts as an additional guard by
ensuring that district courts will have fewer opportunities to expand
the ATS. Additionally, when a claim has been exhausted and the dis-
trict court must determine whether the claim can be brought under
the ATS, the court will have the added legitimacy of arguing that it is
acting because other forums proved futile.
CONCLUSION
The ATS can be an extremely effective resource to redress viola-
tions of human rights internationally. This is especially true if a plain-
tiff can collect from a corporation for actions associated with that
corporation's projects. What has remained unclear in the wake of
Sosa is how far the ATS will expand. The recent use of the Statute
raises serious questions about comity and the role the U.S. courts
should play in policing abuses of human rights in other countries.
The Supreme Court began to address these concerns in Sosa, but its
directives to district courts remain vague and difficult to implement
with precision.
Although not a perfect solution, prudential exhaustion, as imple-
mented by the Ninth Circuit, solves many of the problems that the
Supreme Court attempted to fix in Sosa. Most importantly, prudential
exhaustion provides limits on the claims that a district court can hear
under the ATS. In so doing, the doctrine promotes comity and re-
stricts the courts' potential for interfering in foreign policy. It also
maintains a forum that can address violations of human rights.
Currently, there are not many claims brought under the ATS.
This fact, though, does not negate the importance of determining
how to implement the goals the Supreme Court articulated in Sosa.
Courts and plaintiffs are determining the limits of the ATS on a case-
by-case basis. In addition, in recent years, litigation has increased, es-
pecially against corporations, and this litigation could be a source of
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remuneration for victims. Prudential exhaustion offers what is neces-
sary for dealing with ATS litigation in the future: clarity and restraint.
At the moment, the Ninth Circuit requires prudential exhaus-
tion. The Eleventh Circuit has held that the ATS has no exhaustion
requirement, 212 but that court reached its decision before the Ninth
Circuit's en banc ruling in Sosa. The Eleventh Circuit did not address
the possibility of prudential exhaustion. Other circuits have not ruled
on this issue. Given that the Supreme Court has only heard one case
involving the ATS, it may prove unlikely that they will hear another
case in the coming years to deal with the split between the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits. Despite the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, though, the
circuit courts should adopt prudential exhaustion. Without addi-
tional guidance from the Supreme Court or Congress, it remains the
best approach for achieving comity and keeping "the door . . . ajar
subject to vigilant doorkeeping."213
212 Jean v. Dordlien, 431 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 2005).
213 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
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